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CrnZENSHIP-EXPATRIATION-DrsTINCTION BETWl!EN NATURALIZED AND
NATURAL BoRN C1TIZENs-Plaintiff's father, a native of Germany, was naturalized in the United States in 1896. In 1901, he returned to Germany with his
American wife, and plaintiff was born in that country in 1905. Plaintiff made
occasional visits to the United States, but was at all times domiciled in Germany.
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He served in the German army during World War II. In 1947, upon refusal of
his application for a passport as a citizen of the United States, he came to this
country on a temporary visa and brought a declaratory judgment action for
adjudication that he was a citizen. The trial court refused to believe his testimony that he did not take the oath of allegiance to Germany and concluded
that he expatriated himself when he took such an oath.1 On appeal, held,
affirmed. (1) The refusal of the trial court to believe plaintiff's testimony was
justified. (2) As plaintiff's citizenship at birth was by virtue of the Act of
1855,2 he was a naturalized citizen, and therefore subject to the expatriation
provision for naturalized citizens in the Act of 1907.3 He has failed to overcome
the presumption of cessation of citizenship that arises thereunder from prolonged
residence in a foreign country. Zimmer v. Acheson,. (10th Cir. 1951) 191 F.
(2d) 209.4
The problem presented by the principal case is whether a person bom in a
foreign country to American parents, thereby becoming an American citizen at
birth, is to be considered a "naturalized" or a "natural bom" citizen of the United
States. The solution will determine whether he may become the President of
this country,5 and whether he is subject to laws providing for the expatriation
of naturalized citizens. The result of the principal case is to limit the category
"natural bom" to those who become citizens under the doctrine of jus soli;6 this
makes it co-extensive with the term "native bom." Of importance in this problem is whether these children took the nationality of their parents at common
law, for if they are citizens by virtue of their birth and without the aid of
statute, then certainly they are "natural bom" and not "naturalized" citizens.
In most continental European countries the doctrine of jus sanguinis1 is applied. 8
England follows the same rule, both by virtue of the common law9 and under
1 (D.C. Kan. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 313.
2 10 Stat. L. 604, §1 (1855), providing that children born outside the limits of the
United States, whose fathers are at the time citizens thereof, are declared to be citizens of
the United States. For a complete historical development of this statute, see 3 HACKWORTH,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §222 (1942).
3 34 Stat. L. 1228, §2 (1907), providing for a rebuttable presumption of the cessation
of citizenship by the residence of a naturalized citizen for two years in the foreign state
from which he came, or for five years in any other foreign state. For a complete historical
development of this statute, see 3 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw §252
(1942).
4Accord: Schaufus v. Attorney General of United States, (D.C. Md. 1942) 45 F.
Supp. 61.
5 U.S. CONST., Art. II, §1.
6 Citizenship of the place of one's birth by virtue of being born within that state.
7 Citizenship of the place of one's descent or parentage, no matter where born.
8 1 WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTION §202 (1922); FLOURNOY AND HUDSON, NATIONALITY LAws (1929); Harvard Research in International Law on Nationality, 23 AM.
J. INT. L., Spec. Supp. 80 (1929).
9 BRooKE's ABRIDGMENT, title Denizen et alien, pl. 6 and 21; title Descent, pl. 47
(1573). See also Calvin's Case, 7 Coke 1, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (1609); Lord Hale in Collingwood v. Pace, 1 Vent. 413, 86 Eng. Rep. 262 (1668-1685).
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a declaratory statute of 1350 guaranteeing such application. 10 As a result, it is
generally concluded, despite occasional dissent,11 that jus sanguinis was the
common law doctrine.12 It is especially noteworthy that the earliest legislation
on this subject in the United States, in 1790 when the terms of the Constitution
were still fresh in the minds of the members of Congress, was a seemingly
declaratory act which provided that "all the children of citizens of the United
States that may be born at sea or out of the limits of the United States shall be
considered as natural born citizens."13 A subsequent enactment in 1802 made
the problem acute by failing to provide for the children born abroad to citizens
of the United States when these parents were not themselves citizens at the date
of the statute. 14 - In an opinion decided under this act, the New York court made
an exhaustive and analytical search of the early English cases and authorities,
and concluded that a person born abroad to an American father is a citizen of
the United States, the doctrine of jus sanguinis being part of the common law,
of which the English statute of 1350 was merely declaratory.15 Since the better
authority is that these persons are citizens by virtue of their birth, and not by
naturalization through legislation, it appears to be error to apply to them the
expatriation statute for naturalized citizens. A declaration of congressional policy
in relation to this matter may be seen in the Nationality Act of 1940, where
naturalization is defined to mean "the conferring of nationality upon a person
after birth."16 This same act also provides for the expatriation of naturalized
citizens in a manner similar to that of the statute in the principal case,17 but in
an entirely different section provides for the expatriation of both nationals born
10 25 Edw. III, stat. 2.
11 See Horace Binney's

famous article, 2 AM.. L. REG. 193 (1854). This article by Mr.
Binney pointed out the inadequacy of the Act of 1802, infra note 14, and was thereby
instrumental in bringing about the Act of 1855, supra note 2. When introducing the latter
act to the House of Representatives, Mr. Cutting said that without such a statute these
children born abroad are aliens. But he also stated that his information was derived from
the writings of Mr. Binney. 28 CoNG. GLOBE 169 (Jan. 13, 1854).
12 2 KEm-'s CoMMENTARIEs, 14th ed., 50 (1896). See also 66 ALBANY L.J. 99
(1904), where it is concluded that these children are natural born citizens of the United
States within the meaning of the Constitution. It is also significant that in the excellent
treatise VAN DYNE, NATURALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1907), the author does not
treat or mention the situation of citizenship by birth to American parents abroad, even in
the section entitled "Naturalization by Special Act of Congress."
13 I Stat. L. 103, ch. 3 (I 790). The phrase concerning natural born citizens was
omitted from subsequent acts. It has been suggested that perhaps the omission was due to
a belief that tlie term was applicable only to persons born in this country. Flournoy,
"Fundamental Principles Relating to Ascertainment of Nationality," 10 FED. B.A.J. 275,
280 (1949). However, there appears to be no official authority leading to this conclusion.
14 2 Stat. L. 155, §4 (1802).
15 Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N.Y. 356 (1863).
16 54 Stat. L. 1137, §lOl(c) (1940), 8 U.S.C. (1946) §501. See also 3 BoUVIER,
LAW DICTIONARY, Rawle's 3d rev. ed., 2300 (1914), defining naturalized citizen as "One
who, being born an alien, has lawfully become a citizen of the United States"; BLACK, LAw
DICTIONARY, 3d ed., 1223 (1933): "One who, being an alien by birth••••"
11 54 Stat. L. 1170, §404 (1940), 8 U.S.C. (1946) §804.
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in the United States and nationals born outside the United States of an American parent.18 In deciding that plaintiff is a naturalized citizen, the court in the
principal case relied on United States v. Wong IDm Ark,19 in which the Supreme Court concluded from an examination of the Fourteenth Amendment
that there are only two classes of citizenship, native born and naturalized.20
The result of such a restrictive interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
would be to void a statute providing for the citizenship of children born to our
citizens abroad, for they could not be citizens unless naturalized in the United
States at majority.21 This result is highly improbable. Although since 1907 these
children must take certain steps at the age of eighteen and at majority if they
remain abroad,22 these acts are merely to retain the rights of citizenship which
they had at birth, and are not requirements for the acquisition of citizenship.23
Certainly the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to take citizenship away
from anyone, but rather was passed to assure citizenship to those born in this
country but not considered to be citizens. In view of this purpose and of the
reference in the Constitution to natural born citizens, it is probable that the
declaration of citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to
be exhaustive. Nor does its language compel such an interpretation. It is submitted, therefore, that "natural born" is not merely co-extensive with "native
born," but rather that it is broader and encompasses "native born." The classes
of citizenship are, then, (1) natural born, including native born citizens and
those born outside the United States but who are citizens from birth, and (2)
naturalized citizens, being those who became citizens by naturalization after
birth.
Gordon I. Ginsberg, S.Ed.

1s 54 Stat. L. 1169, §402 (1940), 8 U.S.C. (1946) §802.
10 169 U.S. 649, 18 S.Ct. 456 (1897).
20 Id. at 702. At 703 the majority decision,

in its dicta, states that foreign born children
are naturalized by congressional enactment.
21 See dissent, supra note 19, at 705. At 714, Chief Justice Fuller states, "the children
of our citizens born abroad were always natural born citizens from the standpoint of this
Government."
22 34 Stat. L. 1229, §6 (1907); 54 Stat. L. 1138, §201 (1940), 8 U.S.C. (1946) §601.
23 38 Op. Atty. Gen. 10, 14-18 (1934-37). See also Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S.
657 at 667, 47 S.Ct. 772 (1927), holding that whether or not a person shall be deemed
to have a right to claim United States citizenship is to be determined at time of birth.

